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INCENTIVES IN TEACHER RETIREMENT SYSTEMS
1. INTRODUCTION
Pensions have long been an important part of compensation for teachers in
public schools. Traditionally, it has been argued, salaries have been relatively
low, but pension benefits have been relatively high for teachers and others
who spend their careers in public service. This mix of current versus deferred
income was rationalized by the contention that the public good was best served
by the longevity of service that would be induced by these pension plans (NEA
1995).1 In recent decades, however, evidence has grown that many of these
plans, in both the private and the public sector, may actually have shortened
rather than lengthened professional careers by encouraging early retirements.2
This highlights the growing disconnect between state teacher pension sys-
tems and the larger public discussion of pension and Social Security solvency
in an era of longer life spans and the impending bulge of retirees (see, for exam-
ple, Diamond and Orszag 2003; Kotlikoff and Burns 2004; Munnell and Sass
2008). Nearly all proposed remedies for fixing Social Security involve raising
retirement ages as part of the menu. By contrast, there is little discussion of the
incentives to retire even earlier in teaching; indeed, early retirement plans are
commonplace in teaching, even as traditional pension plans are disappearing
entirely in much of the private sector.
The cost side of employee benefits also affects labor markets by driving a
wedge between the amount paid by employers and the take-home pay received
by teachers. The sharp rise in that wedge due to employee health insurance
costs is well documented. However, less well known are the growing costs and
large unfunded liabilities for some teacher pension plans and virtually all re-
tiree health insurance plans. In Ohio, for example, the combined contributions
of teachers and school districts for retirement benefits have risen steadily from
10 percent in 1945 to 24 percent today. But even this large “tax wedge” falls
short of what is needed, and pension officials are recommending a phased
increase to 29 percent to shore up funding for pensions and retiree health
benefits. At this level, retiree benefits for teachers and other professionals
would be consuming well over $1,000 of the annual per student expenditures.
The costs of school retiree benefits (including “legacy” costs from unfunded
1. As the National Education Association (NEA) report points out, however, this purpose has “been
lost for many in the mists of time,” and “many pension administrators would be hard-pressed to
give an account of why their systems are structured as is except to say that ‘the Legislature did it’ or
‘It is a result of bargaining’” (NEA 1995, p. 3).
2. Kotlikoff and Wise (1987) showed the incentives for early retirement in private defined benefit
pension plans and argued that their spread in the postwar period contributed to declining labor
force participation of older workers up to that time. More recently, Friedberg and Webb (2005)
showed that the private sector shift toward defined contribution plans has contributed to the rise of
retirement ages since the 1980s. With regard to teachers, Harris and Adams (2007) find considerably
higher rates of labor force exit at ages 56–64 than in comparable professions as well as evidence
that this is due to their pension coverage.
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benefits for previous retirees) consume a sizable share of K–12 spending, sim-
ilar to the benefit overhang of GM, Chrysler, and Ford, which finally forced
them to overhaul their retiree benefits.3
As the costs of teacher retiree benefit systems receive more attention from
policy makers, it is important to begin asking what effect these systems have on
recruitment, retention, and workforce quality and whether these are efficient
expenditures. A substantial literature in labor economics demonstrates that the
incentives in pension systems matter, not only for the timing of retirement
but for labor turnover and workforce quality (Friedberg and Webb 2005; Asch,
Haider, and Zissimopoulos 2005; Ippolito 1997; Stock and Wise 1990). Unfor-
tunately, little of this literature pertains to teacher pensions. While there have
been many studies of the effect of current compensation on teacher turnover
(e.g., Murnane and Olsen 1990; Stinebrickner 2001; Hanushek, Kain, and
Rivkin 2004; Podgursky, Monroe, and Watson 2004), the econometric litera-
ture on teacher pensions is very slender. The only published econometric study
to date is by Furgeson, Strauss, and Vogt (2006), who find that Pennsylvania
teachers responded to pension incentives.4
In this article, we analyze the incentives embedded in teacher pension sys-
tems by examining the pattern of pension wealth accumulation over a teacher’s
career. As we shall see, these systems feature dramatic peaks, cliffs, and valleys
in pension wealth accumulation that can distort career decisions—or penalize
teachers for not adapting their plans to the system’s benefit structure. In many
states, teachers will accumulate little pension wealth until their early fifties,
at which point they can suddenly reap large increases. But if they stay much
beyond such a pension “peak” they can suffer declines in pension wealth,
incurring a tax-like financial penalty for staying too long. This is one simple
pattern with no compelling rationale, but systems can also exhibit even more
peculiar accumulation patterns that reward or penalize teachers at seemingly
arbitrarily chosen points in their career.
Our main contribution in this article is to illustrate graphically the peaks
and valleys in pension wealth accumulation that operate over the course of a
teacher’s career in an illustrative set of six state systems. They are in contrast
with the much smoother path of pension wealth accumulation under alterna-
tive professional pension plans, increasingly common in other sectors, that
tie benefits more closely to contributions and that, as a result, provide more
neutral incentives for career decisions.
3. The focus of this article is on the incentive structure of teacher retirement benefits and not their
overall level. For a discussion of that issue, see Costrell and Podgursky (2009).
4. See also Brown 2008 for a study of teacher retirements in the Los Angeles (LA) Unified school
district.
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2. HOW TEACHER PENSIONS WORK
Public school teachers are almost universally covered by traditional defined
benefit (DB) pension systems. We say “traditional” because these are the types
of plans that were the norm in both the public and the private sector until
recent decades. However, this is no longer the case in the private sector, where
employers have shifted dramatically to 401(k)-type defined contribution (DC)
systems and restructured their DB systems as well (more on this below).5 In
a traditional DB system, the employer has an obligation to provide a regular
retirement check to employees upon their retirement.
Typically, a DB teacher pension plan requires that both teachers and em-
ployers make a contribution each year to a pension trust fund. On average,
these contributions are smaller for those teachers who are part of the Social
Security system and larger for those who are not covered. We estimate that in
the systems covered by Social Security, employees contribute an average of 4.5
percent and employers contribute 9.0 percent, for a total of 13.5 percent. This is
in addition to the 12.4 percent combined employer and employee contribution
to the Social Security system. By contrast, in noncovered systems, employees
contribute an average of 7.8 percent and employers contribute 11.1 percent, for
a total of 18.9 percent (Costrell and Podgursky 2009).
In a fully funded system, these contributions and the investment returns
they earn should cover the benefits these teachers are accruing for their future
retirement. However, in many states the teacher pension systems have accrued
large unfunded liabilities.6 These have arisen for several reasons; most sys-
tems were originally pay as you go (i.e., no pre-funding), and benefits have been
added over time (including early retirement benefits) without commensurate
funding. As a result, employer and teacher contributions must cover not only
the currently accruing liabilities (known as normal costs) but also the amorti-
zation of previously accrued unfunded liabilities—the so-called legacy costs.7
5. Data collected by the U.S. Department of Labor show that DC plans now predominate in the private
sector (Hansen 2008).
6. The unfunded liabilities and funding ratios for pension funds in the six states included in this
study, as of 2007, are: Arkansas ($1.8 billion, 85.3 percent), California ($19.6 billion, 87.0 percent
[2006]), Massachusetts ($9.7 billion, 69.3 percent [including Boston]), Missouri ($5.3 billion, 83.5
percent), Ohio ($14.5 billion, 82.2 percent), and Texas ($12.5 billion, 89.2 percent). Sources: Public
Employee Retirement Administration Commission (PERAC) 2007; Public School and Education
Employee Retirement Systems of Missouri (PSRS/PEERS) 2007; State Teachers Retirement System
of Ohio (STRSOH) 2007a; Teacher Retirement System of Texas (TRS) 2007a; Arkansas Teacher
Retirement System (ATRS) 2008; California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS) 2008.
Note that all these estimates discount future liabilities at rates of 8 percent or higher. Most financial
economists believe that these future liabilities should be discounted at a lower (and low risk) rate,
which is required accounting practice for private sector pension funds. Were that practice followed
for these public teacher funds, the funding ratios would be much lower (Waring 2008).
7. It is important to note that these contributions do not include future costs for retiree health
insurance—an issue that is now beginning to appear on education finance radar screens.
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Once a teacher is vested (usually after five or ten years), she or he becomes
eligible to receive a pension upon reaching a certain age and/or length of
service. Different versions of these eligibility rules are discussed below, but
they typically allow teachers to draw a pension well before age 65, especially if
they have been working since their mid-20s.
Benefits at retirement are usually determined by a formula of the following
sort:
Annual Beneﬁt = r (YOS, Age) ·YOS ·FAS. (1)
In this expression, YOS denotes years of service, the final average salary (FAS)
is an average of the last few years of salary (typically three), and r is a percentage
that we will call the “replacement factor” that may be constant but is often a
function of service and age.8 In Missouri, for example, teachers at normal
retirement earn 2.5 percent for each year of teaching service. Thus a teacher
with thirty years of service would earn 75 percent of the final average salary.
So if the final average salary were $60,000 the teacher would receive:
Annual Beneﬁt = .025 × 30 × $60,000 = $45,000,
payable for life. If the teacher were to separate from service prior to being
eligible to receive the pension, the first draw would be deferred and the amount
of the pension would be frozen until that time. Once the pension draw begins,
there is typically some form of inflation adjustment, although the nature of it
varies from state to state.
Table 1 summarizes some of the key parameters of DB pension plans in
six states. While not randomly chosen (we inhabit two of these states), they
are broadly representative of the universe of teacher pension plans.9 More
complete tables have been published by the National Education Association
(NEA) and others, showing similar variation in these pension parameters
across states (NEA 2006; Loeb and Miller 2006).
The complexity of the formula varies from state to state. Arkansas, for
example, has a relatively simple formula. Once one reaches age sixty or twenty-
eight years of service, one can draw a pension equal to the final average salary
times 2.15 percent times years of service (plus $900 per year). One can start
drawing the pension earlier, after twenty-five, twenty-six, or twenty-seven years
of service, but with an adjustment of 85 percent, 90 percent, or 95 percent,
8. States will often specify a replacement factor for “normal” retirement but also have various “early”
retirement provisions that can be expressed as age- or service-based reductions in the normal
replacement factor.
9. These six states account for 29 percent of the total fall 2004 employment of public school teachers
(U.S. Department of Education 2008, table 63).
179
INCENTIVES IN TEACHER RETIREMENT SYSTEMS
Ta
bl
e
1
.
K
ey
Fe
at
ur
es
of
S
el
ec
te
d
S
ta
te
D
efi
ne
d
B
en
efi
t
Te
ac
he
r
Pe
ns
io
n
Pl
an
s
O
hi
o
A
rk
an
sa
s
C
al
ifo
rn
ia
M
as
sa
ch
us
et
ts
M
is
so
ur
i
Te
xa
s
In
S
oc
ia
lS
ec
ur
ity
N
o
Ye
s
N
o
N
o
N
o
Va
rie
s
by
di
st
ric
t
Ve
st
in
g
(y
ea
rs
)
5
5
5
1
0
5
5
R
et
ire
m
en
t
el
ig
ib
ili
ty
(n
or
m
al
or
ea
rly
)
N
or
m
al
:
Ag
e
=
6
5
;
or
YO
S
=
3
0
Ea
rly
:
Ag
e
=
6
0
;
or
ag
e
=
5
5
if
YO
S
=
2
5
N
or
m
al
:
Ag
e
=
6
0
;
or
YO
S
=
2
8
Ea
rly
:
YO
S
=
2
5
Ag
e
=
5
5
;
or
ag
e
=
5
0
if
YO
S
=
3
0
Ag
e
=
5
5
;
or
YO
S
=
2
0
N
or
m
al
:
Ag
e
=
6
0
;
or
YO
S
=
3
0
;
or
ag
e
+
YO
S
=
8
0
Ea
rly
:
Ag
e
=
5
5
;
or
YO
S
=
2
5
N
or
m
al
:
Ag
e
=
6
5
;
or
ag
e
+
YO
S
=
8
0
an
d
ag
e
=
6
0
Ea
rly
:
Ag
e
=
5
5
;
or
YO
S
=
3
0
;
or
ag
e
+
YO
S
=
8
0
C
on
tr
ib
ut
io
n
ra
te
s
D
is
tr
ic
t
1
4
%
a
Te
ac
he
r
1
0
%
Em
pl
oy
er
1
4
%
Te
ac
he
r
6
%
b
Em
pl
oy
er
8
.2
5
%
S
ta
te
4
.5
2
%
c
Te
ac
he
r
8
%
d
S
ta
te
1
5
.6
%
e
Te
ac
he
r
1
1
%
f
D
is
tr
ic
t
1
2
.5
%
Te
ac
he
r
1
2
.5
%
S
ta
te
7
.9
8
%
g
Te
ac
he
r
6
.9
%
h
R
ep
la
ce
m
en
t
fa
ct
or
(p
er
ce
nt
pe
r
ye
ar
of
se
rv
ic
e)
Ye
ar
s
1
–3
0
:
2
.2
%
Ye
ar
3
1
on
ly
:
2
.5
%
Ye
ar
3
2
on
ly
:
2
.6
%
,
..
.
Fo
r
YO
S
≥
3
5
,
ad
d
9
%
to
to
ta
l
2
.1
5
%
+
$
9
0
0
Li
ne
ar
se
gm
en
ts
:
1
.1
%
at
ag
e
5
0
1
.4
%
at
ag
e
5
5
2
.0
%
at
ag
e
6
0
2
.4
%
at
ag
e
6
3
Fo
r
YO
S
≥
3
0
,
ad
d
0
.2
%
to
fa
ct
or
,
to
m
ax
of
2
.4
%
Li
ne
ar
:
0
.1
%
at
ag
e
4
1
to
2
.5
%
at
ag
e
6
5
Fo
r
YO
S
≥
3
0
,
ad
d
2
%
×
(Y
O
S
–
2
4
)
M
ax
re
pl
ac
em
en
t
=
8
0
%
N
or
m
al
,
or
ag
e
=
5
5
:
2
.5
%
,
YO
S
≤
3
0
,
2
.5
5
%
,
YO
S
>
3
0
Ea
rly
:
2
5
≤
YO
S
<
3
0
:
2
.2
0
%
,
YO
S
=
2
5
ris
in
g
lin
ea
rly
to
2
.4
0
%
,
YO
S
=
2
9
2
.3
%
C
O
LA
fo
rm
ul
a
3
%
,
si
m
pl
e
3
%
,
si
m
pl
e
2
%
,
si
m
pl
e,
pl
us
flo
or
of
8
0
%
in
iti
al
pu
rc
ha
si
ng
po
w
er
3
%
,
si
m
pl
e,
on
fir
st
$
1
2
,0
0
0
C
PI
,
co
m
po
un
d,
up
to
1
.8
0
m
ax
im
um
fa
ct
or
N
on
e
in
st
at
ut
e
(p
er
io
di
c,
re
tr
oa
ct
iv
e)
N
ot
es
:Y
O
S
=
ye
ar
s
of
se
rv
ic
e;
C
O
LA
=
co
st
of
liv
in
g
al
lo
w
an
ce
;
C
PI
=
co
ns
um
er
pr
ic
e
in
de
x.
a I
nc
lu
de
s
1
%
fo
r
re
tir
ee
he
al
th
in
su
ra
nc
e.
b
C
on
tr
ib
ut
or
y
m
em
be
rs
on
ly.
Av
er
ag
e
is
4
.8
0
%
,
in
cl
ud
in
g
no
nc
on
tr
ib
ut
or
y.
c I
nc
lu
de
s
2
.5
%
fo
r
8
0
%
flo
or
on
in
iti
al
pu
rc
ha
si
ng
po
w
er
(s
ee
C
al
S
TR
S
2
0
0
7
,
p.
7
).
d
In
cl
ud
es
2
%
fo
r
a
su
pp
le
m
en
ta
ld
efi
ne
d
co
nt
rib
ut
io
n
pl
an
(s
ee
C
al
S
TR
S
2
0
0
7
,
p.
1
1
).
e C
al
cu
la
te
d
fr
om
FY
0
7
st
at
e
ap
pr
op
ria
tio
n
(P
ER
AC
2
0
0
7
).
f F
or
al
lt
ea
ch
er
s
hi
re
d
si
nc
e
2
0
0
0
.
g
In
cl
ud
es
1
.4
%
fo
r
re
tir
ee
he
al
th
in
su
ra
nc
e.
h
In
cl
ud
es
0
.5
%
fo
r
re
tir
ee
he
al
th
in
su
ra
nc
e.
S
ou
rc
es
:N
AS
R
A
(2
0
0
8
);
in
di
vi
du
al
st
at
e
co
m
pr
eh
en
si
ve
an
nu
al
fin
an
ci
al
re
po
rt
s
an
d
pe
ns
io
n
ha
nd
bo
ok
s
(M
TR
S
2
0
0
6
;A
TR
S
2
0
0
7
;C
al
S
TR
S
2
0
0
7
;P
S
R
S
2
0
0
8
;S
TR
S
O
hi
o
2
0
0
7
b;
TR
S
2
0
0
7
b)
.
180
Robert M. Costrell and Michael Podgursky
respectively. The formulas of other states are more complicated, as we shall
see below.
The composite effect of these systems—whether they are simple or
complex—is hard to discern from the system’s parameters. To appreciate
the powerful incentive effects of these systems, and thus make informative
comparisons among states, we use the parameters to examine how teachers
accumulate pension wealth with each year of employment.
3. PENSION WEALTH AND EARNINGS WEALTH
The parameters of teacher pension plans can be used to estimate the magnitude
of pension benefits using the concept of present value. When an individual
retires under a DB plan, he or she is entitled to a stream of payments with
a lump sum value that can be readily determined using standard actuarial
methods. By the same token, the stream of earnings over one’s work life
can also be converted to a lump sum for the purpose of comparison. It is
simply the cumulative earnings over time, with interest accrued. Hence the
two streams of income—earnings during one’s work life and pension benefits
during retirement—can be placed on a common footing.
Formally, consider an individual’s pension wealth, P , at some potential age
of separation, As . The stream of expected payments may begin immediately or
may (perhaps must) be deferred until some later retirement age. The present
value of those payments is:
P (As ) =
∑
A≥As
(1 + r )(As−A) f (A | As ) · B (A | As ) , (2)
where B(A | As ) is the defined benefit one will receive at age A, given that one
has separated at age As , and f (A | As ) is the conditional probability of survival
to that age.
The benefit stream may itself be a choice among alternative streams open
to the individual, based upon the choice of when to begin receiving payments.
The best choice is often simply to receive benefits as soon after separation as
possible—but not always, since there may be an age reduction in benefits for
receipt prior to “normal” retirement age. In modeling pension wealth below,
we assume that individuals separating at age As will choose the stream of
payments that maximizes present value.10
10. This is not as strong an assumption as it might appear at first sight. We are not assuming that
teachers choose their age of separation to maximize present value—that is the major decision, and
obviously there are many other factors that affect it. We are only assuming here that for any given
age of separation, where the individual has to choose whether to collect the pension immediately (if
eligible) or to defer, and for how long, this decision (a relatively minor one) is based on maximizing
present value. In cases in which it pays to defer, teachers may well receive advice to that effect from
the pension professionals in the state retirement office. In many cases the formula is such that
181
INCENTIVES IN TEACHER RETIREMENT SYSTEMS
60 60 60 60 60
60 60 60
60 60 60
60 60
60 60
60 60
6060
55
55
55
55
55
55
56 57
58
59
60 61 62 63 64
65
$-
$200,000 
$400,000 
$600,000 
$800,000 
$1,000,000 
$1,200,000 
$1,400,000 
25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65
ad
jus
ted
 fo
r i
nf
lat
ion
, $
20
08
age at separation (entry age = 25) 
(Assumptions:  2007–8 Columbus salary grid, inflating at 2.5%; COLA = 3%; interest rate = 5%; Female 2004 CDC Mortality Table.)
at 25 years of service, 
eligible for early retirement at 55
at 35 years of service, 
incentive for delayed retirement 
Figure 1. Pension Wealth, in Dollars: Ohio (age of first pension draw indicated)
In principle, P (As ) represents the market value of the annuity. If instead
of providing a promise to pay annual benefits the employer provides a lump
sum of this magnitude upon separation, the employee could buy the same
annuity on the market. The teacher’s pension wealth, P (As ), is the size of the
401(k) that would be required to generate the same stream of payments he or
she would be owed upon separation at age As .
Figure 1 depicts the pension wealth, in inflation-adjusted dollars, for a
twenty-five-year-old entrant to the Ohio teaching force who works continuously
until leaving service at various ages of separation.11 The salary schedule as-
sumed is that of the state capital (Columbus), under which teachers receive
annual step increases and also lane increases as they move from a B.A. to a
master’s degree. The entire salary grid is assumed to increase at 2.5 percent
inflation.12 We assume a 5 percent interest rate13 and use the most current
discretionary deferrals are actuarially similar to one another, so the precise choice made is not that
important. For all these reasons, the assumption made in the text is not particularly strong.
11. Similar diagrams can be drawn for individuals entering service at different ages.
12. Typically a three-year contract will include three grids, each of which is an increase over the
preceding one, and subsequent contracts will have grids that are similarly higher. So, for example,
if a teacher’s first step increase is 4 percent, she will receive that increase plus the effect of moving
to the next year’s grid, assumed here to be 2.5 percent higher, for a total increase of 6.6 percent
(1.04 × 1.025 − 1). If the teacher also shifts “lanes” by acquiring a master’s degree (assumed here to
occur after six years), there is an additional increase. Most grids have a top step (14 in Columbus),
after which the only increases are due to shifts in the grid, except for longevity increases that may
also be included, for example, at years 19, 23, 27, and 30 in Columbus’s contract.
13. As mentioned in note 6, there is a dispute between financial economists and actuaries regarding
the prudent assumption for the rate of return. The 5 percent figure here is closer to the economists’
recommendation than that of the actuaries, who typically use about 8 percent. The higher discount
rate will affect the dollar amount for figure 1 (e.g., the pension wealth for a teacher separating at age
fifty-six drops from $997,000 to $724,000) but will not have much effect on the spikes and valleys
in the other diagrams, which are the main focus of this article.
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Figure 2. Pension Wealth as Percent of Cumulative Earnings: Ohio (age of first pension draw indi-
cated)
female mortality tables (Arias 2007) from the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC).14
The accumulation of pension wealth is not smooth and steady, but rises
with fits and starts after age forty-nine, due to eligibility rules for early retire-
ment and the like (discussed in more detail below). During her first twenty-four
years in the classroom, this teacher accumulates about $309,000 in pension
wealth. However, over the next six years she accumulates more than $100,000
per year, approaching the million dollar mark by age fifty-five. Pension wealth
reaches a peak by her early sixties and then starts to decline.
For purposes of comparison, it is useful to define one’s earnings wealth
analogously to that of pension wealth:
E (As ) =
∑
A<As
(1 + r )(As−A−1) W (A), (3)
where W(A) is one’s annual wage at age A. Thus E (As ) is simply cumulative
earnings with accrued interest. It can be thought of as the lump sum that would
have been sufficient to fund the stream of earnings, as evaluated at the age of
separation. Since pension wealth is the present value of a stream of payments
going forward and earnings wealth is the present value of a stream of payments
going backward, both evaluated at the same point in time (at age As ), they are
comparable measures, capitalizing these two components of compensation.
Figure 2 depicts pension wealth as a percentage of cumulative earnings,
P (As )/E (As ). This measure has a fairly intuitive interpretation. If one nets
14. Most teachers are female. For males, the pension wealth is a bit lower due to shorter life expectancies,
but the curves have very similar shapes.
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out the employee contribution (10 percent in the case of Ohio), it expresses
deferred compensation as a percent add-on to compensation during one’s
working life. Thus an individual separating at age fifty-five receives pension
benefits worth 38 percent of cumulative earnings, for a net fringe benefit
rate of 28 percent. Conversely, an individual separating at age thirty would
receive pension benefits worth only 7 percent of cumulative earnings, which
is negative, net of employee contribution, so this individual (and others up to
age thirty-five) would be better off withdrawing her contributions even though
she is vested.
The pension wealth measure P (As )/E (As ) also has a more concrete in-
terpretation from the funding side. It represents the percentage of earnings
that must be set aside each year (from employer and/or employee) in order to
fully fund the pension benefits, for any given age of separation.15 Clearly, those
individuals who retire in their mid- to late fifties receive significantly more in
benefits than has been contributed to the system on their behalf, while those
who separate from service earlier in their career do not. Figure 2 therefore
illustrates the uneven distribution of benefits that is built into the system.
Subtracting out the Ohio teachers’ contribution of 10 percent of earnings, one
sees that the net benefits are even more unequally distributed than the gross
benefits.
This is true of other states as well. Comparable diagrams typically show a
single peak in pension wealth, as a percent of cumulative earnings, but there
is significant variation due to the specifics of each state’s benefit formula (see
Costrell and Podgursky 2007a for these other diagrams).
Finally, note that a state’s pension wealth curve often has distinct segments,
with markedly different slopes, as in figure 1. The important implication of
this is that the annual increments to pension wealth at different ages can vary
quite dramatically, as we shall presently show.
4. ANNUAL CHANGE IN PENSION WEALTH AS A MEASURE
OF DEFERRED COMPENSATION
The evolution of a teacher’s pension wealth over her career captures the in-
centives embedded in the pension system. Properly calculated, the change in
pension wealth is a measure of deferred compensation, which can be com-
pared with current compensation. Specifically, one must distinguish between
changes in wealth due to a change in the stream of payments (evaluated at the
same point in time) and a change in wealth due solely to the passage of time.
The latter piece is simply the interest on the previous year’s wealth—it is the
return to capital, not labor. It is the former piece, the change in wealth due to a
15. This does not include the portion of contributions to amortize unfunded liabilities from previous
cohorts.
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change in the stream of payments, that is the proper measure of labor income.
Finally, we must also net out the employee’s contribution to the pension fund
because that cannot be considered part of labor income.
Recall that pension wealth is the size of the 401(k) that would be required
to purchase the stream of pension benefits. Thus the growth of that notional
401(k), net of interest and net of employee contributions, is conceptually iden-
tical to the 401(k) contributions made by the employer. That is, our measure
of deferred income is equivalent to the employer’s annual contribution to the
corresponding 401(k) plan.
Formally, the change in pension wealth net of interest is:16
p(As ) ≡ P (As ) − r · P (As − 1). (4)
This can be expressed more explicitly as:
p(As ) =
∑
A≥As
(1 + r )(As−A)[ f (A | As )B(A | As )
− f (A | As − 1)B(A | As − 1)] − (1 + r ) B (As − 1 | As − 1) . (5)
As stated earlier, this is the effect on wealth of deferring separation due to
changes in the expected stream of pension payments.
Let us examine equation 5 in more detail. The first term represents the in-
crease in expected pension payments from As forward. We see from the brack-
eted expression, which is positive, that this is due to the rise in benefits from the
pension formula (B(A | As ) > B(A | As − 1)), as well as the higher probability
of surviving to receive each benefit payment ( f (A | As ) > f (A | As − 1)).
Note that if As is at an age or service level where the formula allows one
to accelerate the first pension draw (e.g., age fifty in Ohio, as shown in figure
1 and discussed further below), then one or more of the B(A | As − 1) terms
are zero while the corresponding B(A | As ) terms are positive. Thus at such
an age the annual income from deferred compensation includes the sudden
addition of one or more years of pension payments, frontloaded. Conversely, if
one were already eligible to receive a pension the previous year, at age As − 1,
then deferring separation forgoes that benefit payment, as shown in the last
term in equation 5.
In sum, the income from deferred compensation in any given year has
several conceptual pieces: (1) the rise in expected benefit payments due to
the formula (more years of service, higher final average salary, and, in some
states, a higher replacement factor); (2) at certain break points in the formula,
16. Analogously, it can be easily shown that the change in earnings wealth, net of interest on the prior
year’s earnings wealth, is simply the annual earnings income: e(As ) ≡ E(As ) − r ·E(As − 1) =
W(As − 1).
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Figure 3. Deferred Income per Year, as Percent of Salary: Ohio. Net Addition to Pension Wealth
from an Additional Year of Teaching (age of first pension draw indicated)
additional years of pension eligibility; and (3) later in one’s career, the loss of
a year of benefits from deferring separation.
5. PENSION SPIKES
Figures 3–9 are the most important for an analysis of labor market behavior.
Here we show the change in net pension wealth arising from an additional year
of work, expressed as a percent of salary for Ohio and five other states. Behind
each of these charts is a pension wealth accrual chart such as that in figure 1.
Each of these charts answers the question posed above: how much does a
teacher’s net pension wealth change if she or he works an additional year?
Specifically, we consider deferred income (net of interest on prior pension
wealth and net of employee contributions), expressed as a percent of the
teacher’s salary.17
Ohio
Consider Ohio, depicted in figure 3. A teacher who enters service at age
twenty-five accrues pension wealth upon vesting (five years), starting at roughly
17. It is important to note that the pension accrual concept used here is different from the actuarial
concept. The actuarial concept is based on the assumption that the individual will work to a
given normal retirement age, independent of the age at which the accrual is being evaluated. It is
calculated to guide the employer in providing prudent reserves, and it results in smooth curves. The
economist’s concept, depicted here, considers each year as the individual’s year of separation; it is
calculated to depict the incentives for individual decisions about separation. As has been previously
established in the economics literature (e.g., Kotlikoff and Wise 1987; Friedberg and Webb 2005),
these curves have sharp kinks, leading to strong incentives to stay or leave at various ages.
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10 percent of annual earnings. This is offset by her contribution to the fund, so
her net addition to wealth is zero. This is her deferred income that year. Her
deferred income gradually rises to 23 percent of her salary in her twenty-fourth
year (age forty-nine). Throughout this period, her deferred income reflects the
credit she is accruing to a higher pension, collectable at age sixty.
After her twenty-fifth year (age fifty), the eligibility rules allow her to
collect benefits starting five years early, deferring the first pension draw to
age fifty-five instead of sixty. This yields a large sudden increase in pension
wealth. In that year her net pension wealth jumps by 164 percent of her
annual earnings. Each of the next five years also yields deferred income that
approaches or exceeds her current income. Here the reason is not additional
years of pension eligibility. Rather, annual deferred income is high because the
early retirement reduction gets phased out over this period, rapidly raising the
annual pension, until thirty years of service, when she qualifies for “normal”
retirement.
The growth of pension wealth drops off sharply over the next few years—it
actually goes negative for ages 56–59. Her annual pension continues to rise
with each additional year of service (albeit more slowly). But this is entirely
offset by the fact that she has now reached the point where she collects her
pension immediately upon separation, so each additional year of work means
forgoing a year of pension payments.
This is followed by yet another sharp spike at age sixty (thirty-five years ex-
perience), equal to 132 percent of her salary that year. That is because Ohio has
an incentive for delayed retirement, adding 9 percent to the total replacement
rate after thirty-five years (as indicated in table 1), beyond the 2.9 percent given
by the formula.
Beyond age sixty, pension wealth shrinks once again (net of interest) and at
an accelerating rate. At age sixty-one, her pension contribution and reduction
in pension wealth constitute an implicit 33 percent tax on her earnings (over
and above her state and federal income tax). By age sixty-five, the pension
system is imposing a tax of 92 percent, so, together with her income tax, she
is effectively paying for the privilege of teaching.
Table 2 gives more detail on what is going on in figure 3. Each cell gives
the starting annual pension, as a percent of FAS for the corresponding YOS
and age. The blank region indicates no pension eligibility. The region with
bold figures (age = 65 or YOS ≥ 30) is the region of normal retirement, and
the bonus year YOS = 35 is indicated by bold italic figures. The region with
unbolded italic figures is the region of early retirement, where the pension
is reduced by various adjustment factors. The table’s shaded cells denote
the wealth-maximizing choice of first pension draw for a twenty-five-year-old
entrant, after separation at any given YOS.
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Figure 4. Deferred Income per Year, as Percent of Salary: Arkansas. Net Addition to Pension Wealth
from an Additional Year of Teaching (age of first pension draw indicated)
As the table shows, age sixty is the earliest she can collect up through her
twenty-fourth year of service, and that does in fact maximize pension wealth,
even though further deferral (e.g., to the “normal” retirement age of 65) would
raise her annual pension. Upon her twenty-fifth year, she maximizes pension
wealth by taking the five extra years of pension eligibility (jumping from the
shaded cell at [24, 60] to the one at [25, 55]), despite the fact that the pension
is reduced from 44.9 percent of FAS to 41.3 percent. The draw at age fifty-five
continues to be her optimal choice until she reaches age fifty-five, at thirty
years of service. For service beyond that point, her first draw is immediate
upon separation, so the shaded cells move diagonally to the southeast. Note
the particularly large jump in the annual pension, from 76.6 percent of FAS
to 88.5 percent, at YOS = 35, the bonus that generates figure 3’s third spike.
Arkansas
The case of Ohio is a bit more convoluted than most—its system of incentives
for early retirement and for delayed retirement results in multiple spikes. But
most of the state systems we have examined also display sharp pension spikes.
In Arkansas, a particularly sharp spike occurs at age fifty (twenty-fifth year of
service for a twenty-five-year-old entrant), as depicted in figure 4. In that year,
our teacher would earn an increase in pension wealth worth almost five times
her salary. In other words, a teacher with a $50,000 salary would earn total
compensation of nearly $300,000 for that year of teaching, before dropping off
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precipitously the next year. The reason is that she is eligible for ten extra years
of pension payments because she qualifies for early retirement immediately
after 25 YOS, instead of having to defer to age sixty. Upon reaching 28 YOS,
she qualifies for normal retirement, and beyond that point—age fifty-three for
a twenty-five-year-old entrant—her deferred income turns negative each year.
This is because the rise in annual pension does not outweigh the loss of a
year’s pension payment.
Missouri
Missouri’s formula is a bit more complicated. It allows one to draw a normal
pension at age ≥ 60 or YOS ≥ 30 but also has a “rule of 80” under which
one is eligible once age + YOS reaches 80. In table 3, normal retirement is
represented by the region with bold figures, and the rule of 80 is represented by
the serrated border of that region. Alternatively, one can take early retirement
at ages 55–59 with downward adjustment factors, or with YOS from 25 to 29
(“25 and out”) but with lower replacement factors (2.20%–2.40% instead of
the normal 2.50%).18 These options are represented by the two wedge-shaped
regions in table 3 with italicized figures.
This formula, like that in Ohio, gives rise to multiple spikes, depicted in
figure 5. A twenty-five-year-old entrant considering separation during her first
twenty years would do best to defer her first pension draw to normal retirement
at age sixty. Her twenty-first year of service (at age forty-six) allows her to bring
the first pension draw forward a year, to age fifty-nine, under the rule of 80.
She then starts moving down the serrated border of the normal retirement
region in table 3. This extra year of pension eligibility gives a bump to her
pension wealth accrual that year, seen in figure 5. This recurs for each of
the next three years. If she were to stay on through her twenty-fifth year (age
fifty), she qualifies for the attractive 25-and-out option, under which she would
collect immediately. This means six extra years of pension eligibility, as she
jumps from the shaded cell [24, 56] in table 3 to [25, 50]. This generates her
biggest pension spike in figure 5, worth almost four times her salary. If she
stays two more years, she should avail herself again of the rule of 80, and at
age fifty-three (28 YOS) she would qualify for normal retirement immediately
upon separation—her second spike. A third bump occurs at age 56 due to
an increase in the replacement factor at 31 YOS. Beyond that point, deferred
income turns negative.
18. This 25-and-out provision has been a “temporary” feature of Missouri code since 1996. Originally
set to expire in 1998, it was enhanced and extended to 2000 and then again to 2003, 2008, and
2013.
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Figure 5. Deferred Income per Year, as Percent of Salary: Missouri. Net Addition to Pension Wealth
from an Additional Year of Teaching (age of first pension draw indicated)
Figure 6. Deferred Income per Year, as Percent of Salary: California. Net Addition to Pension Wealth
from an Additional Year of Teaching
Other States and General Comments
The pension systems in California and Massachusetts also generate spikes
for our representative teacher in her early to mid-fifties (figures 6–7), as did
the system in Texas, prior to recent changes (figure 8). The details of what
generates each spike vary from state to state, but there are a few general points.
Since both the teacher and the employer are making the same contributions
year after year, one might imagine that pension wealth accrual would be fairly
smooth and consistent. However, contribution rates do not drive wealth accrual
in these pension plans. Pension wealth is only loosely tied to contributions. The
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Figure 8. Deferred Income per Year, as Percent of Salary: Texas. Net Addition to Pension Wealth
from an Additional Year of Teaching
primary drivers in pension wealth accrual are changes in the annual annuity
payment (determined by equation 1) and the number of years the teacher can
expect to collect it. As we have seen, it is the latter that is often the wild card
in these systems. In other cases, spikes are created by enhancements to the
benefit formula at specified ages or YOS.
As mentioned above, pension accrual spikes have been documented by
previous researchers in other sectors, notably by Kotlikoff and Wise (1987) in
their exhaustive analysis of thousands of private sector plans. However, the
magnitude of the spikes we have found in teacher systems dwarfs those found
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by Kotlikoff and Wise, typically by an order of magnitude.19 One important
reason for this appears to be a difference in early retirement provisions between
many teacher systems today and the private DB systems of the 1980s. Those
private systems tended to reduce early retirement pensions based on age rather
than service; the reductions were often less than actuarially warranted—hence
the spikes—but age was at least the actuarially relevant variable. By contrast,
teacher systems often condition early retirement on YOS thresholds, which
are unrelated to the present value of future benefits.20 This accentuates the
disjunction between benefits and contributions, playing a significant role in
generating the very large spikes we have seen.
Once teachers get past the spike (or spikes), pension wealth accrual turns
negative. For all these states this occurs by the early sixties, and in some states
it occurs much earlier. This is not because the annual pension annuity falls.
In fact, it is rising (although eventually teachers hit a pension cap typically set
at 100 percent of earnings). Instead pension wealth falls because the teacher
collects the pension for one less year and the annual payment is not enhanced
sufficiently to offset this loss.
Finally, these charts also illustrate how legislatures alter these incentive
structures periodically (even if the public policy impact may not always have
been fully understood at the time). In the cases of California and Massachusetts
(see figures 6 and 7), these spikes were created by benefit enhancements en-
acted when pension funds were flush, following the bull market of the 1990s.21
Ohio’s multiple-spiked system also reflects benefit enhancements enacted over
19. For example, among the 513 plans that set early retirement at age fifty-five and normal retirement
at age sixty-five, the median accrual rate at age fifty-five (where the main spike generally occurs for
these plans) was found to be 10 percent. That accrual rate was 21 percent for the plan at the largest
fifth percentile by average accrual and 41 percent for the plan with the maximum accrual ratios
(Kotlikoff and Wise 1987, table 10.3).
20. YOS is related to contributions, and this is crudely represented in the basic benefit formula, r ·
YOS · FAS, but the YOS-eligibility rules for teachers lead to large discontinuities, as we have seen.
The calculations in Kotlikoff and Wise ignore service requirements for early retirement, but the
minimal nature of those requirements leads them to conclude that this is unlikely to significantly
affect their results (see their note 2).
21. Prior to these changes, California and Massachusetts did not have notable spikes because their
formulas were driven by replacement factors that rose gently with age more so than by disconti-
nuities in the eligibility criteria. California’s benefit enhancements since 1999 added 0.2 percent
to the replacement factor at YOS = 30, creating a spike at that point. In addition, the maximum
replacement factor was raised from 2.0 percent at age sixty to 2.4 percent at age sixty-three, which
pushed out the age of negative accrual. Another enhancement was to allow the highest single year
of salary to serve as the FAS after twenty-five years as opposed to the three-year average, a rather
unusual feature that accounts for the minor spike at 25 YOS. In the case of Massachusetts, the en-
hancement in 2001 added 2% × (YOS − 24) to the replacement rate, for YOS ≥ 30, which created
the spike at 30 YOS. This also reduced the age of negative accrual by accelerating the date at which
one reaches the 80 percent cap on the replacement rate. (By way of disclosure, one of us [Costrell]
served in the Massachusetts administration at the time of this change and, along with other staff,
recommended a gubernatorial veto [which was overridden by the legislature]. An account of that
episode can be found in Costrell and Podgursky 2007a, along with further discussion of the effect
on these diagrams of variations in state formulas.)
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the years—it used to have a single spike at age sixty.22 By contrast, recent
changes in Texas’s formula eliminated its spikes in an explicit cost-cutting
measure. Since Texas’s action was not a benefit enhancement, however, the
change applied only to new hires; the vast majority of current teachers still
face the incentives given by the double-peaked curve in figure 8.23
6. PENSION ACCRUAL PATTERNS AT DIFFERENT ENTRY AGES
Figures 1–8 assume entry at age twenty-five. This entry age is representative—
we have estimated from a national sample of new retirees that their median
entry age was 25–26.24 However, it is important to consider variation in this
pattern, especially with the rise of alternative paths into teaching as well as the
traditional career interruptions of teachers.
At first blush, it might seem that the spikes would simply be displaced to
the left or right depending on the entry age of the teacher. Things are not that
simple, however, because the spikes depend in part on the interaction of age
and YOS. For example, if a teacher is eligible for regular retirement at age sixty
or YOS = 30, the magnitude of the spike when YOS hits 30 will depend on the
difference between a teacher’s age at that point and age sixty—the number of
extra years of pension that 30 YOS obtains.
We illustrate some of these complexities by analyzing the Ohio pension
formula. Figure 9 shows the pattern of deferred income over the careers
of three entrant groups. The solid curve is the three-peaked pattern of the
twenty-five-year-old entrant depicted previously in figure 3. The dotted curve
represents a twenty-two-year-old entrant—an entry age that is actually a bit
more common than age twenty-five. It too has three peaks, but they are moved
three years to the left, appearing at ages forty-seven, fifty-two, and fifty-seven.
The peak at age fifty-two is particularly pronounced: a twenty-two-year-old
entrant will, in her thirtieth YOS, raise her pension wealth by the equivalent
of almost four times her salary. This is a bigger spike than for the twenty-
five-year-old entrant because her thirtieth YOS now qualifies her for three
extra years of pension payments (starting at age fifty-two instead of fifty-five).25
Finally, the dashed curve represents the thirty-year-old entrant. For her, the
22. See Costrell and Podgursky (2007b), figure 7 and Appendix A. More generally, this report contains
more detail on the Ohio system.
23. Specifically, Texas, like Missouri, had a rule of 80, but effective with new hires after September
2007, eligibility was restricted to those reaching age sixty. In addition, Texas eliminated another
feature that had allowed one to receive close to the full pension if one was close to fulfilling the rule
of 80, once age = 55 and YOS = 20. These two features had accounted for the two spikes in figure
8’s pre-2006 accrual curve.
24. We tabulated the ages of first-year teachers from the 2003–4 Schools and Staffing Surveys.
25. For the twenty-five-year-old entrant, the thirtieth YOS did not qualify her for any extra years of
pension; her twenty-fifth YOS qualified her for pension at age fifty-five, but by the time she reached
her thirtieth year she was already fifty-five years old. However, her thirtieth year did qualify her for
the full phaseout of the penalty for early retirement.
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Figure 9. Deferred Income as Percent of Salary, Ohio: Entry Ages 22, 25, 30. Net Addition to
Pension Wealth from an Additional Year of Teaching
first two peaks collapse into one at age fifty-five, and the final peak occurs ten
years later upon her thirty-fifth YOS.
Our analysis of Ohio and other states suggests that the curves for twenty-
five-year-old entrants are in fact indicative of the patterns for entry at the most
common entry ages. The accrual patterns for older entrants, such as age thirty,
are not quite as striking, but those for younger entrants, such as age twenty-two,
are even more dramatic and more strongly tilted toward early retirement.
7. INCENTIVE EFFECTS OF PENSION SPIKES
There are two key incentives created by the spikes in pension wealth accrual—
a pull and a push, as it were. First, teachers have a strong incentive to stay on
the job—a pull—until they reap the benefit of the spikes. Even if a teacher is
no longer suited to the job, it may well be worth “putting in one’s time” for a
few more years if it means collecting several hundred thousands of dollars in
pension wealth.26
Second, once a teacher is beyond the spike and into the region of negative
deferred compensation, the pension system creates a disincentive to stay on—
a push out the door—even if one excels at the job. At this point, the pension
system serves as a twofold tax on earnings, first by the required employee con-
tribution and second by the negative wealth accrual; together these can easily
26. A recent survey conducted by the Education Sector (Duffett et al. 2008) sheds light on this point.
Seventy-six percent of teachers agreed (“somewhat” or “strongly”) with this statement: “Too many
veteran teachers who are burned out stay because they do not want to walk away from the benefits
and service time they have accrued.”
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Figure 10. Distribution of Arkansas Retirements by Years of Service, 1998–2008
offset much or even all of one’s salary. That is, the reduction in pension wealth
from working an additional year and forgoing that year’s pension payment
can approach or exceed the teacher’s take-home pay, in which case her total
compensation is little or nothing.
There is ample evidence that such incentives affect behavior. Anecdotal
evidence is commonplace of teachers (and others) timing their retirement
decisions, at least in part, to features of the benefit formula. Pension systems
routinely provide online pension calculators and retirement counseling to
help their members do so. Labor economists have developed more systematic
evidence of the behavioral impact of defined benefit pensions in other fields,
particularly in the private sector (see, e.g., Friedberg and Webb 2005). There
has been much less research on teacher pensions, but that which is available
indicates strong incentive effects (Furgeson, Strauss, and Vogt 2006; Brown
2008; Podgursky, Ni, and Ehlert 2008).
A careful econometric analysis of the effect of these incentives (and changes
in the plan parameters) for our set of states is beyond the scope of this article.
However, the overall effect is seen in even simple tabulations of state retire-
ment data. Consider the case of Arkansas. For most Arkansas teachers, the
critical variable for pension benefits is YOS. As we saw in figure 4, there is
typically a large spike in pension wealth accrual at 25 YOS, upon eligibility
for early retirement, and accrual turns negative after eligibility for normal re-
tirement at 28 YOS. Figure 10 gives the distribution of teacher retirements in
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Arkansas by YOS for the period since these eligibility rules were set in 1997.27
This figure provides clear evidence that teachers do indeed respond to the in-
centives embedded in the pension system. There is a spike in retirements at 25
YOS, consistent with the system’s pull on those teachers who are approaching
25 YOS. And there is a particularly pronounced spike at 28 YOS, followed by a
sharp drop in retirements at 29 YOS and beyond, consistent with the system’s
push to retire once pension wealth accrual turns negative.
This is not to say that the pension system is the sole determinant of teacher
retirement decisions. As figure 10 indicates, 12 percent of retirees were willing
to incur negative pension wealth accrual, teaching beyond 28 YOS, but not
many were willing to stay on for long—only 3 percent stayed on after 30 YOS.28
Also, 45 percent of retirees had fewer than 25 YOS. This figure includes late-
starting teachers, or teachers with interrupted spells of employment, who
taught until age qualified them for retirement instead of service. But it also
includes many teachers who stopped teaching for any number of non-pension
reasons before meeting either age or service requirements and thus deferring
first pension draw until reaching the minimum age. Still, it is evident from
figure 10 that the distribution of YOS cannot be understood without reference
to the pension parameters.
Moreover, teachers surely respond to changes in pension parameters.
Figure 11 depicts Arkansas’ distribution of retirees under the previous set
of parameters, 1984–96, when the YOS requirement for normal retirement
was thirty. As one would expect, the major spike was at 30 YOS instead of 28.29
8. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: EMPLOYMENT
AFTER “RETIREMENT”
We have seen that teacher pension systems often have strong incentives built
into them to encourage teachers to retire at relatively young ages. Clearly many
teachers, even if they nominally “retire” in their fifties, will continue with
labor market work of some sort for many years. Given concerns about teacher
shortages and pressures from the No Child Left Behind Act to make sure
that all classrooms are staffed with qualified teachers, it may be educationally
27. This set of teachers excludes participants in Arkansas’ T-DROP system, discussed below. It is
also restricted to those in that state’s contributory system. Since 1999, all new full-time teachers
were contributory, but prior to then teachers could choose instead to participate in a noncontrib-
utory system, with lower benefits. About one-third of recent non-T-DROP teacher retirees were
noncontributory.
28. As stated in the previous note, this excludes participants in T-DROP, a program discussed below
that allows teachers to continue teaching beyond the twenty-eight-year mark while attenuating the
negative accrual.
29. There remains a spike at 25 YOS, consistent with the fact that the early retirement YOS was
unchanged. The vesting requirement, however, was reduced from ten years to five in 1997, and this
is reflected in the difference between 5–9 YOS retirements in figures 10 and 11.
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Figure 11. Distribution of Arkansas Retirements by Years of Service, 1984–1996
problematic for districts to nudge qualified and effective teachers out the door
at such early ages. Not surprisingly, all these teacher pension systems have
provisions allowing educators to continue to teach and collect their pension
(a practice called double dipping). In many states, these provisions have been
expanding. Here are some examples (see also Bragg 2003).
1. Part-time employment. All the pension systems considered here allow
teachers who have retired to continue to work in covered employment on
a part-time basis (without accruing additional benefits).
2. Employment in shortage areas. Many states permit retired educators to
teach full time for a specified period of time in “shortage” fields.
3. Break in employment. Some states allow teachers to return to full-time
employment and collect their pension after a specified break in service. In
California the required break is twelve months. In Ohio, a retired teacher
can return to work the next day but must wait two months before receiving
pension benefits.
4. DROP plans. Many states have implemented deferred retirement option
plans (DROPs). These permit teachers to continue working full time for a
specified period of time (one to ten years), during which some portion of
their pension check goes into what amounts to an individual retirement
account. This prevents or attenuates negative pension wealth accrual, pro-
viding an incentive for teachers to “retire” and return to work.
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Figure 12 illustrates the incentives under the Arkansas T-DROP plan. Un-
der this plan, a teacher with 28 or more YOS can keep working after retirement
for up to ten years, with 60–70 percent of her pension check going into a re-
tirement account and accumulating interest until she actually leaves teaching.
Figure 12 assumes that a teacher who entered at age 25 exercises this option
after 28–30 years of service (at ages 53–55). Under these simulations, the T-
DROP eliminates most of the pension penalty for continuing to teach beyond
28 years. (The curves are higher for entering T-DROP at 30 versus 29 versus
28 YOS because the deposit rates are 70 percent, 65 percent, and 60 percent,
respectively.)
As would be expected, T-DROP participants work more years than non-T-
DROP participants. We saw in figure 10 that only 12 percent of recent non-T-
DROP retirees had more than 28 YOS. However, T-DROP entrants require a
minimum of 28 YOS30 and they put in an average of 4–5 years of additional
teaching while in T-DROP. Taken together, the median T-DROP teacher works
for 32–33 years. Adding those retirees from 1998–2008 who were in T-DROP
to those who were not gives us figure 13. This figure shows the distribution of
YOS plus, for T-DROP participants, years in T-DROP because these are also
teaching years (but are not credited as YOS for pension benefits).
In comparing figures 10 and 13, one should be cautious in causally at-
tributing all the longer employment spans to the T-DROP program; no doubt
30. From the program’s inception in 1995 until 1999, the minimum was 30 YOS.
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T-DROP participants self-select from among those who would work longer
anyway. In this respect, figure 10 overstates the effect of the pension formula’s
incentives for early retirement by omitting the T-DROP participants. Figure 13,
however, does not have that problem, and it still shows a behavioral response
to the system’s incentives, with unmistakable spikes at 25 and 28 YOS. As
for the effect of T-DROP itself, the comparison of figures 13 and 10 is at least
consistent with the intent of T-DROP to blunt some of the system’s incentives
toward early retirement.
In addition to these various re-employment provisions, there is no obstacle
to retirees resuming employment in other fields, or even in teaching itself,
by crossing a state line or a district boundary to work in a different pension
system. For example, Missouri teachers in the state pension system can retire
and work full time in the St. Louis or Kansas City (KC) systems, or a KC,
Missouri, teacher can cross the border and work in KC, Kansas.
The net result of all of these practices is that the decision to retire (i.e.,
collect a retirement check) is not necessarily the same as a decision to quit
teaching in public schools. Unfortunately, we are aware of no comprehensive
national data on this topic. Limited data from a national survey conducted by
the U.S. Department of Education suggest that at least 5 percent of the public
school teaching workforce is also collecting a teacher pension. A longitudinal
study of Missouri teachers found that 12 percent of teachers worked at least
one year part or full time following retirement (Podgursky and Ehlert 2007).
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The significance of these practices has not been fully explored. They have
no parallel in the private sector because early retirement incentives there are
always part of a downsizing effort, not one that offers re-employment. In
teaching, by contrast, early retirement incentives have a completely different
origin, namely, legislatively enacted benefit enhancements, typically under
heavy union lobbying. Re-employment provisions are often a response to the
unintended (if often predictable) problems created by these incentives. In other
words, these provisions are ad hoc fixes to some of the perverse incentives
created by enhanced pension spikes.31
Post-retirement employment blurs the distinction between current and
deferred compensation. At the very least, this calls into question the meaning
of published data on teacher compensation. In addition, as re-employment
becomes easier, the incentive to retire at or near a pension spike becomes more
pronounced—there is no downside if employment can continue. It might also
be in the district’s interest, if the pension costs are borne by the state, because
new teachers cost the district less than older ones.32 One might therefore
expect that retirements would become further concentrated around the spikes,
maximizing the total cost to taxpayers.33
9. MORE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: HEALTH INSURANCE
Another consequence of early teacher retirement is a linked demand for retiree
health insurance coverage. Since Medicare eligibility does not begin until age
65, teachers who retire in their fifties have a coverage gap of many years. In
light of this, many school districts and states have extended health insurance
coverage to retirees. Most retiree health insurance benefits have been paid by
school districts out of current revenues (i.e., no trust fund was created to pay
for these future liabilities, as was also the case originally with most pensions).
Under new government accounting rules (GASB 43 and 45), benefit plans and
employers must begin providing estimates of these liabilities in their annual
financial statements. First hints at the figures are staggering. LA Unified,
which provides complete health insurance coverage for all retirees, initially
31. In higher education, where DC plans (overwhelmingly TIAA-CREF) predominate, some colleges
have encouraged phased retirement, wherein professors move to half-time employment status
with a commensurate reduction in pay but the college continues to maintain contributions to the
retirement plan based on full-time equivalent earnings. In general, partial retirement is easier to
implement in a DC-type system. Also, as discussed below, in contrast to the typical teacher pension
system, pension wealth never falls in a DC (or cash balance) system. Thus there is no work penalty
or tax to offset. The costs and benefits of phased retirement are far more transparent (Clark 2004).
32. The logic of cost shifting also contributes to the phenomenon of buyouts, under which a district
will offer additional financial incentives for teachers to retire. A consulting sector has developed to
advise school districts on how to do this. (See www.epcinternet.com/, and especially the K–12 client
list.)
33. For example, 63.9 percent of recent contributory Arkansas retirees, including T-DROP participants,
clustered at 25–30 YOS.
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estimated a $5 billion unfunded liability as of July 2004. The following year it
was increased to $10 billion.34 A recent report by the Cato Institute estimates
that these unfunded liabilities of state and local governments could total $1.5
trillion (Edwards and Gokhale 2006; Deloitte Research 2006).
The consequences of early teacher retirements for publicly funded health
liabilities have not been studied. However, to the extent that early retirement
increases the total number of individuals—active and retired—relying on the
school system for health insurance, the cost to taxpayers is increased.
10. OPTIONS FOR REFORM: CASH BALANCE OR DEFINED
CONTRIBUTION PLANS
The underlying problem with traditional DB systems is their distortion of
retirement incentives, stemming from the broken link between benefits and
contributions. DC systems and cash balance (CB) plans restore that link. Many
large corporations have switched to DC and CB plans over the last twenty
years. Some public entities, including a few teacher pension systems (Ohio
and Florida), have also started to offer DC- or CB-type options in their plans.35
CB plans are very similar to DC plans, in that both systems tie benefits
closely to contributions. Under a CB plan, employees and employers contribute
a certain percentage of earnings to an individual retirement account, the same
as under DC. The main difference is that in a CB plan, the return is guaranteed
by the employer (typically at a rate comparable to risk-free Treasury bonds),
so the market risk is not borne by the employee. Often the debate over DB
versus DC plans focuses on the shift of market risk from employer to employee
rather than on retirement incentives. Since our subject here is the incentives,
we focus first on CB plans, where employers continue to bear the market risk,
so no market risk shifting occurs.
The incentive neutrality of CB plans with regard to age of separation can
be simply depicted. In the net pension wealth accrual graphs (figures 3–9), the
irregular curves would simply be replaced with flat lines, at a percentage given
by the employer contribution (e.g., at 14 percent in figure 3). There are no spikes
inducing teachers to stay to their mid-fifties and then to leave. Pension wealth
never declines: if a teacher wants to work another year, the account grows by
the contributions, plus the investment return. This can then be converted to
34. The factors that contributed to that increase were, in descending order of importance: (1) a change
in the discount rate applied; (2) change in actuarial cost methods; (3) health care cost increases; (4)
increased life expectancy and changes in retirement and turnover assumptions; and (5) one year of
interest on the previous liability and additional benefits paid (Los Angeles Unified School District
2006).
35. One difficulty in evaluating these plans is that the DC option may not be on a level playing field
with the traditional DB plan. For example, in Ohio the DB plan offers subsidized retiree health
insurance but the DC plan does not.
203
INCENTIVES IN TEACHER RETIREMENT SYSTEMS
an annuity (many CB plans do this automatically). If a teacher works another
year, the starting annuity is increased in an actuarially fair manner because
there is one less year of retirement to cover.
Such a retirement-neutral plan leaves the employee much more latitude to
decide when to retire or switch careers, based on individual preferences. It also
makes it easier for schools to retain effective teachers who might otherwise
be driven by the pull-push incentives of pension spikes created by the heavy-
handed traditional DB formulas. It is also fiscally more stable because benefits
are closely tied to contributions. Unfunded liabilities do not arise so readily,
and legislatures have less opportunity to enhance benefits by shifting costs to
future generations of taxpayers and teachers.
Some of these features of CB also characterize DC plans because they too
tie benefits to contributions. In fact, DC plans are totally immune to unfunded
liabilities because there is no employer obligation beyond the contribution.
On the other hand, the employee bears the risk of any investment decisions
and also forgoes the benefit of institutional investment expertise. Also, since
employee contributions are typically voluntary under DC plans, there is con-
cern that employees will not save sufficiently for a secure retirement.36 Finally,
there is the concern that DC plan participants will tend not to annuitize their
retirement balances, thereby incurring the risk of outliving one’s assets. These
concerns have led some to argue that DC plans might best be introduced as part
of a hybrid plan that still includes a DB component. Note that many of these
drawbacks can be avoided under CB, which is why many private employers
switched to CB from the traditional type of DB plan.
A particularly relevant model for K–12 retirement reform may be found in
higher education. Established in 1918, TIAA-CREF represents a popular and
effective system that provides lifetime annuities and retirement security as
well as transparency and complete mobility of retirement benefits to several
million faculty, staff, and others in roughly 15,000 nonprofit institutions. Some
private K–12 school teachers participate as well. While nominally a DC plan,
TIAA-CREF has avoided many problems associated with such plans. Fees are
very low, members have relatively few investment choices, and annuity payout
options are the norm. By providing a guaranteed annual return combined
with an annuity payout, TIAA more closely resembles a cash balance DB plan
in that downside market risk continues to be borne by the plan (Greenough
1990).
In comparing traditional DB plans with contribution-based plans such as
DC or CB, the issue of equity is also quite important. Traditional DB plans
36. This was reportedly the case for many teachers in West Virginia’s shift from DB to DC. See Levitz
2008.
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create wide variations in pension wealth between those who retire at or near the
pension spikes and those who leave service early in their career. As we saw in
figure 2, the former will receive a windfall of pension wealth that far exceeds the
joint contributions, while the latter will not. Indeed, this feature creates a huge
element of risk because an entering teacher often does not know in advance
whether she will be a short timer, leaving the system with little pension wealth,
or a career teacher receiving benefits that far outweigh the contributions. In
this respect, CB and DC plans are less risky than traditional DB plans because
teachers will receive benefits commensurate with contributions, regardless of
length of career.
From a fiscal viewpoint, it is important to note that the low benefits for
short timers, combined with high teacher contribution rates in some states,
can help keep the state’s average cost down in a traditional DB plan. In
Massachusetts, for example, the normal cost of teacher pensions (i.e., leaving
aside the legacy costs, which amortize unfunded liabilities) is 11.9 percent of
payroll, and teacher contributions average 9.7 percent.37 Assuming (as most
actuarial reports do) that all employee contributions go to normal cost and
none to amortize the unfunded liability, this leaves an employer contribution
to normal cost of only 2.2 percent of pay.38 This is less than the typical em-
ployer match on a DC or CB plan. The corresponding figures in our other
states are higher: 4.0 percent in Texas, 4.8 percent in Ohio, 8.5 percent in
Arkansas, 9.1 percent in Missouri, and 10.8 percent in California.39
In any case, whether the net employer normal cost is low or high, shifting
to CB or DC and eliminating the tilt in benefits against short timers will almost
certainly reduce benefits for “long termers” and may also be more expensive
overall, depending on how generous the new program is. The point here is
not so much the generosity of current plans but their idiosyncratic structure,
resulting in a very uneven distribution of benefits and strong incentives to
time career decisions to arbitrary plan parameters. In our view, that is the
most compelling reason for considering pension reform.
37. For teachers hired after 2000, the contribution is 11 percent.
38. The vast majority of the employer’s contributions in Massachusetts are to amortize the unfunded
liabilities. For FY07, these legacy costs totaled 13.4 percent of payroll (author calculations based on
PERAC 2007, pp. 8, 11).
39. The corresponding figures for employer contributions to amortize the unfunded liabilities are
2.6 percent in Texas, 8.2 percent in Ohio, 5.5 percent in Arkansas, 3.4 percent in Missouri, and
0.8 percent in California (ATRS 2008; Milliman Consultants and Actuaries 2007; PSRS/PEERS
2007; STRS Ohio 2007a; TRS 2007a). Note that all these calculations are simply a residual from
total employer contributions rather than those that would be required to amortize the liability over
some fixed horizon, such as the Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB) standard of
thirty years.
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11. CONCLUSION
Policy discussions about teacher recruitment, retention, and quality often fo-
cus on salary. However, pension policy also has important consequences for
the teaching workforce. In the recruitment of young teachers, the attraction
of pension benefits may seem distant and uncertain, especially because young
workers often change jobs. The costs, however, are incurred from the start in
contributions to the plan that can exceed 20 percent between employer and
employee. Many young teachers, who are paying off student loans or attempt-
ing to start families and buy homes, might prefer more of their compensation
up front rather than diverted into a system from which they may well never
benefit. They may also be deterred by the fact that if they leave teaching after
five or ten years, they will have accumulated little pension wealth, compared
with some of their nonteaching peers in CB or 401(k) plans.
With regard to retention, it is difficult to imagine an efficiency rationale
for the peculiar retirement incentives we find in these systems. Teachers are
pulled to the pension spikes and then pushed out at relatively early ages by
negative pension wealth accrual. The labor economics literature has developed
the notion that DB pensions in the private sector might be interpreted as part
of a mechanism to prevent shirking as one approaches the optimal date of sep-
aration (see Lazear 1979; Gustman, Mitchell, and Steinmeier 1994). Under
this theory, age earnings profiles are steeper than the experience productivity
profile, so workers are effectively posting a bond, inducing them to exert effort
so they will not be fired before reaching late-career levels of compensation. On
this view, rapid pension accrual is part of the steep age earnings profile, and the
region of negative accrual serves the same purpose as mandatory retirement
to prevent workers from overexploiting the gap between late-career compen-
sation and productivity. This theory cannot persuasively apply to public school
teaching because tenure virtually eliminates any fear of firing. Alternatively,
the backloading of pension wealth accrual might make sense if research found
very strong returns to worker experience. However, the vast majority of educa-
tion production function studies find little return to experience beyond the first
few years (Hanushek and Rivkin 2006). We are aware of no productivity evi-
dence, for example, that could justify the differences in wealth accrual between
a teacher with fifteen and one with twenty-five to thirty years of experience. We
have also noted the (presumably) unintended byproducts of these DB systems
in the form of growing retiree health insurance costs and re-employment of
retirees (double-dipping).40
40. It is possible that the practice of double dipping is an efficient response to the constraints of the highly
regulated personnel environment in which schools operate. Since tenure laws make it prohibitively
costly to dismiss more senior teachers, pensioning them off en masse and then selectively rehiring
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In addition, pension policy has powerful effects on K–12 school finance.
Teachers who retire in their mid-fifties draw pension benefits for periods of
time that are likely to equal or exceed their years of classroom service. A teacher
retiring at age fifty-five with a $50,000 annual pension (indexed) has received
an annuity valued at about $1 million. Moreover, she may well receive heavily
subsidized retiree health insurance for a good while. Unless these benefits are
offset by low benefits for short timers or high employee contributions, this can
squeeze other parts of school budgets.
For all these reasons, we believe that school districts and states would be
well advised to consider systems with smooth wealth accrual such as DC or
CB plans. These systems are more transparent, tie benefits more closely to
contributions, and do not penalize mobility or job shopping among young
teachers. Given its record in higher education and private K–12, TIAA-CREF
might be particularly useful in attracting career changers or young graduates
in fields such as science and math, where 401(k) or 403(b) accounts are the
norm (and where they are likely to encounter TIAA-CREF employers in future
employment).
More generally, education policy makers should at least consider experi-
ments that provide actuarially fair alternatives to traditional DB plans for new
teaching recruits and evaluate their utility in the recruitment and retention of
high-quality teachers. Even if most teachers continue to choose the traditional
DB option, providing new recruits with a choice may, at the margin, help
attract some of the most mobile and academically gifted candidates who have
the best nonteaching options.
In addition, such policy experiments could help provide empirical evidence
on the labor market effects of pension reforms. Such experimental studies,
along with other nonexperimental research on existing teacher pension sys-
tems (exploiting variation over time and across states), could provide valuable
insights into the potential of pension reform for improved teacher recruitment,
retention, and quality.
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